PraisonAI
AI Agents Framework with Self Reflection and MCP support
11 incidents, 200 advisories on file
PraisonAI is distributed via PyPI (praisonai); review its source code, dependencies, and requested permissions before use.
Based on public adoption and transparency signals as of Oct 24, 2026. Our opinion, not a code audit or security guarantee.
What it can access
- Local filesNo local folder access notedLOW
- Command executionRuns shell or system commandsREVIEW
- Network reachConnects to outside service APINOTED
- CredentialsNo API token requiredLOW
- Package sourcePyPI (praisonai)PUBLIC
Inferred from this listing’s public package details and description. Check the project’s source before installing.
Install
uvx praisonaiEverything known
6 critical incidents, 23 critical advisories, 3 high incidents, 58 high advisories, 2 medium incidents, 16 medium advisories and 103 with no severity listed on record. The newest is from 2026-10-15. Every report lists a fix. Check each one for the version.
11 incidents · 200 advisories · 0 news articles · 0 community threads · checked 2026-10-30
Popularity grade: B (from public signals such as stars and downloads, not a code review). Graded 2026-10-24.
Showing 1-10 of 211Showing all 211Showing 11 incidents of 211Showing 200 advisories of 211
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: AgentMail webhook lacks signature verification, allowing unauthenticated message injection and sender spoofing
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: AgentMail webhook mode accepts forged unsigned message.received events and invokes agents
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: AICoder Arbitrary File Write and Command Execution via LLM Tool Calls
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Code Injection via f-string Interpolation in Deploy API Server Generation
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: ContextGatherer include resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: MCP HTTP-stream transport is unauthenticated by default, exposing tool enumeration and an unvalidated tool-call surface
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: PGVector and Cassandra knowledge stores interpolate vector dimensions into DDL
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Project custom command templates can read outside-workspace files into model prompts
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Prompt Injection Defense Bypassed for HIGH-Level Threats
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Prompt-injection defense blocks only when 3+ detector families fire simultaneously; realistic single-vector injections pass through unblocked
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: SecurityPolicy command/path/import restrictions are completely unenforced by the default SubprocessSandbox backend
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Shell command allowlist bypass via find -exec built-in action
- IncidentCVE-2026-61427: PraisonAI MCP HTTP-stream transport unauthenticated by default (<= 4.6.77)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: AICoder Arbitrary File Write and Command Execution via LLM Tool Calls
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: API deploy code generator embeds unescaped YAML fields into Python source
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Call API localhost-only authentication bypass via spoofed Host header
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: ContextGatherer include resolution permits absolute and traversal reads outside the workspace
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Jobs API is unauthenticated by default and allows attacker-controlled webhook SSRF
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: PGVector and Cassandra knowledge stores interpolate vector dimensions into DDL
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Project custom command templates can read outside-workspace files into model prompts
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Prompt-injection defense blocks only when 3+ detector families fire simultaneously; realistic single-vector injections pass through unblocked
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: SecurityPolicy command/path/import restrictions are completely unenforced by the default SubprocessSandbox backend
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Shell command allowlist bypass via find -exec built-in action
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: AgentMail webhook lacks signature verification, allowing unauthenticated message injection and sender spoofing
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: AgentMail webhook mode accepts forged unsigned message.received events and invokes agents
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Code Injection via f-string Interpolation in Deploy API Server Generation
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Prompt Injection Defense Bypassed for HIGH-Level Threats
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has a Browser Server WebSocket origin validation bypass via unanchored regex (patch bypass of CVE-2026-40289 / GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated tool execution on local MCP server
- AdvisoryPraisonAI MCP HTTP server has unauthenticated unbounded session accumulation (memory exhaustion; session TTL never enforced)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation
- AdvisoryPraisonAI workflow include bypasses tools.py autoload opt-in and executes included recipe code
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] `praisonai serve agents --api-key` is silently ignored — agent-invocation routes (`POST /agents`, `POST /agents/{agent_name}`) run unau
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] PraisonAI async Jobs API (`/api/v1/runs`) has no authentication — unauthenticated job execution, result theft, cancel and delete
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: [Path Traversal] agent tools escape the configured workspace via symlinks
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: `--api-key` flag on `praisonai serve` is not properly enforced
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114
- IncidentPraisonAI MCP HTTP server has unauthenticated unbounded session accumulation (memory exhaustion; session TTL never enforced)
- Incidentpraisonaiagents vulnerable to SSRF in web_crawl tool via redirect-following and DNS rebinding (validate-then-fetch gap)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has a Browser Server WebSocket origin validation bypass via unanchored regex (patch bypass of CVE-2026-40289 / GHSA-8x8f-54wf-vv92)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has an origin validation bypass in MCP HTTP Stream transport that allows browser-mediated unauthenticated tool execution on local MCP server
- AdvisoryPraisonAI serve agents --api-key is ignored, allowing unauthenticated remote agent execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via DNS rebinding bypass in webhook_url validation
- AdvisoryPraisonAI workflow include bypasses tools.py autoload opt-in and executes included recipe code
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] `praisonai serve agents --api-key` is silently ignored — agent-invocation routes (`POST /agents`, `POST /agents/{agent_name}`) run unau
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: [Auth Bypass] PraisonAI async Jobs API (`/api/v1/runs`) has no authentication — unauthenticated job execution, result theft, cancel and delete
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: [Path Traversal] agent tools escape the configured workspace via symlinks
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: `--api-key` flag on `praisonai serve` is not properly enforced
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Authentication fail-open in Recipe server allows unauthenticated access when API key or JWT auth is configured without a secret
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Webhook SSRF via DNS fail-open in `JobSubmitRequest.validate_webhook_url()` — bypass of CVE-2026-40114
- AdvisoryPraisonAI A2U incomplete authentication fix leaves current serve command unauthenticated by default
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary
- AdvisoryPraisonAI DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal
- AdvisoryPraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage
- AdvisoryPraisonAI GitHub template cache path traversal allows outside-cache file write and directory deletion
- AdvisoryPraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe serve Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guard
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe workflow policy can be bypassed by declaring and YAML-approving dangerous tools outside TEMPLATE.yaml
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe.run_stream skips dangerous-tool policy enforcement
- AdvisoryPraisonAI SandlockSandbox falls back to unrestricted subprocess execution when Landlock is unavailable
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Slack app_mention bypasses configured user/channel authorization
- AdvisoryPraisonAI ToolsMCPServer legacy SSE transport accepts attacker Host/Origin and exposes registered tools
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: AgentOS remains unauthenticated after incomplete fix version and allows remote agent invocation
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Arbitrary File Read/Write via `multiedit` Tool Without Path Validation
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Jobs API exposes agent-execution endpoints with no authentication
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in praiso
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication
- Advisorypraisonai: recipe serve auth middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Unauthenticated RCE via Jobs API + Approval Bypass
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Webhook signature verification skipped (fail-open) when secret unset, allowing forged inbound webhooks (WhatsApp & Linear bots)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI CLI automatically resolves @url mentions in prompt text and can read loopback URLs into model context
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has an Arbitrary File Write in Python API
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Arbitrary File Write (Zip Slip) in Templates Extraction
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has ReDoS via Unvalidated User-Controlled Regex in MCPToolIndex.search_tools()
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Sandbox Escape via shell=True and Bypassable Blocklist in SubprocessSandbox
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has Template Injection in Agent Tool Definitions
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has unauthenticated RCE via `tool_override.py` (CVE-2026-40287 patch bypass)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Unauthenticated SSE Event Stream that Exposes All Agent Activity in A2U Server
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has Unrestricted Upload Size in WSGI Recipe Registry Server that Enables Memory Exhaustion DoS
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has unsafe tool resolution in `ToolExecutionMixin.execute_tool`: undeclared `__main__` callables execute
- AdvisoryPraisonAI knowledge-store backends interpolate unvalidated collection names into SQL and CQL queries
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe registry publish path traversal allows out-of-root file write
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory
- AdvisoryPraisonAI ships and generates a legacy API server with authentication disabled by default, allowing unauthenticated workflow execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI spider_tools SSRF protection bypass via alternate loopback host encodings
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Argument Injection into Cloud Run Environment Variables via Unsanitized Comma in gcloud --set-env-vars
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Code Injection and Protection Mechanism Failure
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Decompression Bomb DoS via Recipe Bundle Extraction Without Size Limits
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Implicit Execution of Arbitrary Code via Automatic `tools.py` Loading
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to RCE via Automatic tools.py Import
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Sensitive Environment Variable Exposure via Untrusted MCP Subprocess Execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via Unvalidated webhook_url in Jobs API
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Stored XSS via Unsanitized Agent Output in HTML Rendering (nh3 Not a Required Dependency)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file read via MCP workflow.show, workflow.validate, deploy.validate
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: SQL Injection via unvalidated `table_prefix` in 9 conversation store backends (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-40315)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: SQLiteConversationStore didn't validate table_prefix when constructing SQL queries
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: SSRF via Unvalidated api_base in passthrough() Fallback
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Unauthenticated Allow-List Manipulation Bypasses Agent Tool Approval Safety Controls
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Unauthenticated Information Disclosure of Agent Instructions via /api/agents in AgentOS
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Unauthenticated WebSocket Endpoint Proxies to Paid OpenAI Realtime API Without Rate Limits
- AdvisoryPraisonAI's symlink-extraction bypass of `_safe_extractall` writes outside `dest_dir`
- AdvisoryPraisonAI `deploy --type api` emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions
- AdvisoryPraisonAI call server exposes unauthenticated agent listing, invocation, and deletion when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is unset
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-34935 - OS Command Injection
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Authentication Bypass via OAuthManager.validate_token()
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has critical RCE via `type: job` workflow YAML
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Missing Authentication in WebSocket Gateway
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Path Traversal in FileTools
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Second-Order SQL Injection in `get_all_user_threads`
- AdvisoryPraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal => RCE via Python `.pth` injection
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write / Path Traversal in Action Orchestrator
- AdvisoryPraisonAI vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal in `praisonai recipe unpack`
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to OS Command Injection
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via YAML Deserialization in Agent Definition Loading
- AdvisoryPraisonAI vulnerable to sandbox escape via `print.__self__` builtins module leak in `execute_code` (subprocess mode)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable Untrusted Remote Template Code Execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: OS Command Injection in MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command()
- AdvisoryPraisonAI's unauthenticated A2A official example can reach real LLM-driven `eval()` tool execution
- Incidentnpm PraisonAI codeMode sandbox escape via Function constructor
- IncidentPraisonAI LinearBot processes unsigned webhooks when LINEAR_WEBHOOK_SECRET is missing
- IncidentPraisonAI: AgentOS remains unauthenticated after incomplete fix version and allows remote agent invocation
- Incidentpraisonai: Jobs API exposes agent-execution endpoints with no authentication
- IncidentPraisonAI: Remote Code Execution via Sandbox Escape in `codeMode` Tool
- IncidentUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Jobs API and Approval Bypass in PraisonAI
- AdvisoryPraisonAI A2U incomplete authentication fix leaves current serve command unauthenticated by default
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Code agent tools fail open without a workspace boundary
- AdvisoryPraisonAI DiscordApproval accepts unrelated channel messages as dangerous-tool approvals
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Dynamic Context history and terminal tools read files outside configured storage via path traversal
- AdvisoryPraisonAI dynamic-context artifact tools read arbitrary host files outside artifact storage
- AdvisoryPraisonAI GitHub template cache path traversal allows outside-cache file write and directory deletion
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe serve Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guard
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe workflow policy can be bypassed by declaring and YAML-approving dangerous tools outside TEMPLATE.yaml
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe.run_stream skips dangerous-tool policy enforcement
- AdvisoryPraisonAI SandlockSandbox falls back to unrestricted subprocess execution when Landlock is unavailable
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Slack app_mention bypasses configured user/channel authorization
- AdvisoryPraisonAI ToolsMCPServer legacy SSE transport accepts attacker Host/Origin and exposes registered tools
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Arbitrary File Read/Write via `multiedit` Tool Without Path Validation
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Compute-bridged file tools allow shell command injection
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: HTTPApproval dashboard renders tool arguments as raw HTML, allowing approval-page XSS to approve dangerous tools
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Jobs webhook SSRF protection bypass via DNS rebinding
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Missing Authentication for Critical Function and Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') in praiso
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: PRAISONAI_CALL_AUTH=disabled environment variable unconditionally disables authentication
- Advisorypraisonai: recipe serve auth middleware silently disables itself when no secret is set
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Webhook signature verification skipped (fail-open) when secret unset, allowing forged inbound webhooks (WhatsApp & Linear bots)
- Incidentpraisonai-platform: Any workspace member can rewrite workspace name, description, and settings via PATCH /workspaces/{id}
- IncidentPraisonAI vulnerable to sandbox escape via print.__self__ builtins module leak in execute_code (subprocess mode)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI `deploy --type api` emits a Flask server with authentication disabled by default
- AdvisoryPraisonAI call server exposes unauthenticated agent listing, invocation, and deletion when CALL_SERVER_TOKEN is unset
- AdvisoryPraisonAI CLI automatically resolves @url mentions in prompt text and can read loopback URLs into model context
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has an Arbitrary File Write in Python API
- AdvisoryPraisonAI spider_tools SSRF protection bypass via alternate loopback host encodings
- AdvisoryPraisonAI vulnerable to unauthenticated arbitrary file read via MCP workflow.show, workflow.validate, deploy.validate
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Arbitrary code execution via unguarded `spec.loader.exec_module` in `agents_generator.py` - sibling of CVE-2026-44334
- AdvisoryPraisonAI's unauthenticated A2A official example can reach real LLM-driven `eval()` tool execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has unsafe tool resolution in `ToolExecutionMixin.execute_tool`: undeclared `__main__` callables execute
- AdvisoryPraisonAI knowledge-store backends interpolate unvalidated collection names into SQL and CQL queries
- AdvisoryPraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal => RCE via Python `.pth` injection
- AdvisoryPraisonAI ships and generates a legacy API server with authentication disabled by default, allowing unauthenticated workflow execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI's symlink-extraction bypass of `_safe_extractall` writes outside `dest_dir`
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has unauthenticated RCE via `tool_override.py` (CVE-2026-40287 patch bypass)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-34935 - OS Command Injection
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: SQL Injection via unvalidated `table_prefix` in 9 conversation store backends (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-40315)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Browser Server allows unauthenticated WebSocket clients to hijack connected extension sessions
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has critical RCE via `type: job` workflow YAML
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has Unrestricted Upload Size in WSGI Recipe Registry Server that Enables Memory Exhaustion DoS
- AdvisoryPraisonAI vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal in `praisonai recipe unpack`
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Argument Injection into Cloud Run Environment Variables via Unsanitized Comma in gcloud --set-env-vars
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Code Injection and Protection Mechanism Failure
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Decompression Bomb DoS via Recipe Bundle Extraction Without Size Limits
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Implicit Execution of Arbitrary Code via Automatic `tools.py` Loading
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to RCE via Automatic tools.py Import
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Sensitive Environment Variable Exposure via Untrusted MCP Subprocess Execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via Unvalidated webhook_url in Jobs API
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Stored XSS via Unsanitized Agent Output in HTML Rendering (nh3 Not a Required Dependency)
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable Untrusted Remote Template Code Execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Hardcoded `approval_mode="auto"` in Chainlit UI Overrides Administrator Configuration, Enabling Unapproved Shell Command Execution
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: SQLiteConversationStore didn't validate table_prefix when constructing SQL queries
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Unauthenticated Allow-List Manipulation Bypasses Agent Tool Approval Safety Controls
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Unauthenticated Information Disclosure of Agent Instructions via /api/agents in AgentOS
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: Unauthenticated WebSocket Endpoint Proxies to Paid OpenAI Realtime API Without Rate Limits
- AdvisoryPraisonAI has Template Injection in Agent Tool Definitions
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Unauthenticated SSE Event Stream that Exposes All Agent Activity in A2U Server
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to OS Command Injection
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via YAML Deserialization in Agent Definition Loading
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Arbitrary File Write (Zip Slip) in Templates Extraction
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Path Traversal in FileTools
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe registry publish path traversal allows out-of-root file write
- AdvisoryPraisonAI recipe registry pull path traversal writes files outside the chosen output directory
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write / Path Traversal in Action Orchestrator
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Authentication Bypass via OAuthManager.validate_token()
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Missing Authentication in WebSocket Gateway
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has ReDoS via Unvalidated User-Controlled Regex in MCPToolIndex.search_tools()
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Sandbox Escape via shell=True and Bypassable Blocklist in SubprocessSandbox
- AdvisoryPraisonAI Has Second-Order SQL Injection in `get_all_user_threads`
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: OS Command Injection in MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command()
- AdvisoryPraisonAI: SSRF via Unvalidated api_base in passthrough() Fallback
Sources we read: OSV, GitHub Advisory Database, CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities, 44 security news feeds and our incident library. Last checked 2026-10-30.
About PraisonAI
PraisonAI is an MCP server focused on General: AI Agents Framework with Self Reflection and MCP support.
It is published on PyPI as praisonai and hosted on GitHub at MervinPraison/PraisonAI (9,286 GitHub stars, 2,538 PyPI downloads, last repository push on 2026-10-24). Based on its public metadata, it operates with standard local or API scope without broad shell execution flags noted.
Setup
Check these steps against the project’s own instructions before running anything.
Run the PyPI package praisonai in an isolated environment:
uvx praisonai
See https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI (opens external site) for required environment variables.
Why this grade
Signal-based grade (4/7 points): very widely starred on GitHub, public source code. This reflects adoption and transparency, not a code review.
Popularity and upkeep
- GitHub stars
- 9.3k
- PyPI downloads
- 2.5k
- Listing last refreshed
- 2026-10-28
These are public popularity signals, not a maintenance check. Look at the repository’s commit history and open issues.
Risks to watch for
- Dependency & version pinning: Distributed via PyPI (praisonai). Pin an exact release version or commit SHA rather than floating tags so upstream updates are reviewed first.
How to lower the risk
Least-privilege permissions
- Give it access only to the specific folders, accounts or projects it needs, never your whole drive or admin account.
- Use a separate, limited API key or login just for this tool so you can switch it off without affecting anything else.
Network isolation
- Run it on a work computer or sandbox account, not one holding personal or company-sensitive data.
- If your IT team can, limit which websites and services it is allowed to contact.
Monitoring
- Check its activity history or logs weekly at first, and look at what it changed or sent.
- Turn on alerts for new logins or unusual usage on any account it connects to.
Red flags to watch for
- It asks for more access than its job requires, or prompts you to paste passwords.
- It suddenly updates with new owners, or starts contacting unfamiliar websites.
Questions
How do I install PraisonAI?
Run uvx praisonai (or pip install praisonai) in your terminal, or add the server entry to your claude_desktop_config.json or .cursor/mcp.json as shown in the Setup section on this page. Full setup docs and environment variables are in github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI.
Are there security reports about PraisonAI?
211 reports were found for this package in our research. Titles and dates (OSV, AgentArmorHQ incident library) are listed in the Reports section above. PraisonAI currently holds Grade B (Some risk signals) based on public adoption and transparency signals. Key risk areas to watch include dependency & version pinning:.
Is PraisonAI actively maintained?
PraisonAI has 9.3k GitHub stars and 2.5k PyPI downloads, with its latest repository commit pushed on 2026-10-24. Our directory data was last refreshed on 2026-10-28. Check recent commit activity, release tags, and open issues at github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI before pinning it in production.
What are alternatives to PraisonAI?
Compare PraisonAI side by side with similar MCP servers in the Related tools section on this page, or browse all MCP servers on AgentArmorHQ.
Key facts
- Type
- App connector
- Publisher
- MervinPraison
- Source code
- github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
- Install command
- pip install praisonai
- Est. context load
- ~500 tokens / turn (~3 tool schemas, 0.25% of 200k context)
- Popularity
- 9.3k GitHub stars, 2.5k PyPI downloads
- Last updated
- 2026-10-28
- Last graded
- 2026-10-24
Community
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